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Rebalancing Rhode Island’s Balance
Sheet
Xaykham Rexford Khamsyvoravong*
INTRODUCTION

Rhode Island policymakers should consider an accounting
mechanism that could materially alleviate the pension-funding
crisis: Asset In-Kind Contributions (Asset Transfers)—the transfer
of municipal assets to municipal pension funds. Asset Transfers
have the potential to help rebalance municipal balance sheets by
allowing municipal pension funds to account for the value of
municipal assets, while maintaining public oversight of critical
public infrastructure. This Comment explores whether some of
Rhode Island’s largest and most underfunded municipal pension
funds have the governance structures necessary to make Asset
Transfers a viable tool to improve pension funding.
While this Comment considers Asset Transfers as a viable tool
for multiple Rhode Island municipalities, its most obvious
application is to alleviate the billion dollar pension liability faced
by the City of Providence. 1 If the Providence Water Supply Board
were to be transferred from the city’s balance sheet to that of the
city’s pension fund, it could offset a liability equal to its appraised
valuation—estimated to be $400 million—improving the pension’s
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2020. Thank you to Professor Andrew Spacone, my fiancée Alicia Anthony and
the Roger Williams University Law Review Editorial Board for their guidance
throughout the writing and editing process.
1. Dan McGowan, Treasurer Magaziner: Providence Pension Fund Is RI’s
“Biggest Financial Challenge,” WPRI (Jan. 25, 2019 3:38 PM)
https://www.wpri.com/news/dan-mcgowan/treasurer-magaziner-providencepension-fund-is-ri-s-biggest-financial-challenge-/1725825488
[https://perma.cc/F6AZ-JZNK].
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funding level from its current level, 26.3%, to over 50%. 2 Such a
transfer has the potential to position the fund to negotiate
meaningful reforms, but it is not, in and of itself, a silver bullet to
the pension fund’s cash flow challenges. However, an Asset
Transfer would allow the city to use the value of the Providence
Water Supply Board to help offset its largest liability while
ensuring that the utility remains under public control,
guaranteeing that any future increase in its value accrues back to
the taxpayers rather than to a private third party.
Providence is not alone. Many of Rhode Island’s cities and
towns are on the brink of bankruptcy, driven to this precipice by the
economy and politics. 3 The most burdensome of these pressures are
the massive and growing financial liabilities created by a failure to
properly fund the pensions promised to public employees. 4
Government accounting standards have continuously evolved over
the past decade in an effort to highlight and quantify this burden.5
While these standards now guide government to better reflect its
liabilities, government has yet to maximize the accounting value of
its assets. Asset Transfers should be considered as a tool to help
municipalities leverage the value of their assets to improve the
2. John Hill, Providence Is Hoping the Scituate Reservoir Can Save Its
Economy, PROVIDENCE J. (June 4, 2018), https://www.providencejournal.
com/news/20180601/providence-is-hoping-scituate-reservoir-can-save-itseconomy [https://perma.cc/W4EQ-4HPP].
3. See Randal Edgar, My Turn: Randal Edgar: Rhode Island’s Other
Pension Problem, PROVIDENCE J. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.
providencejournal.com/opinion/20180214/my-turn-randal-edgar-rhodeislands-other-pension-problem?template=ampart
[https://perma.cc/Y67LHT3Y]. See also Economic Tsunami: Data Shows RI Cities & Towns Are
Facing Peril Due to Unfunded Obligation, GOLOCALPROV (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.golocalprov.com/news/economic-tsunami-data-shows-ri-citiestowns-are-facing-peril-due-to-unfunde
[https://perma.cc/G3B6-VXD2]
[hereinafter Economic Tsunami].
4. See Economic Tsunami, supra note 3.
5. See GOV’T ACCT. STANDARDS BD., NEW GASB PENSION STATEMENTS TO
BRING ABOUT MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS IN FINANCIAL REPORTING 1 (Dec. 2013),
https://gasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&
blobnocache=true&blobwhere=1175828264598&blobheader=application%2Fp
df&blobheadername2=Content-Length&blobheadername1=ContentDisposition&blobheadervalue2=145542&blobheadervalue1=filename%3DGA
SB_New_Pension_Statements_article_12-13.pdf&blobcol=urldata
&blobtable=MungoBlobs [https://perma.cc/B5RX-LG6J]; Ted Nesi, Study:
Plans in ‘Critical’ Condition for 17 RI Cities, Towns, WPRI (May 8, 2018, 8:55
PM), https://www.wpri.com/politics/study-pension-plans-in-critical-conditionfor-17-ri-cities-towns/1167190242 [https://perma.cc/VK3U-YFNG].
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funding levels of municipal pension funds.
Policymakers, both in Rhode Island and nationally, typically
chip away at budget challenges by pulling the traditional financial
levers of government: raise revenue (taxes) or cut costs (services,
infrastructure, pensions). 6 In the decade since the financial crisis,
a climate of austerity has dominated public budget decisions,
stunting lawmakers’ willingness to enact additional taxes to raise
revenues.7 Complicating matters further, relatively stagnant
revenue growth has left government unable to keep pace with
inflation, forcing policymakers to focus on whom to cut, rather than
in what to invest. 8 Eventually global events, like the Great
Recession, exacerbate this dilemma, and bankruptcy proceedings
replace budget negotiations, as evidenced by such proceedings in
Detroit, Michigan, and Central Falls, Rhode Island. 9
As that turning point is reached, public officials, in an effort to
maintain control rather than ceding it to the courts, often revert to
extreme measures, including the sale or long-term leasing of
assets—despite the absence of provisions allowing courts to force
liquidation of essential service assets in a chapter nine municipal
bankruptcy. 10 Every year municipalities enter into billions of
dollars of long-term leases or sales of their assets—water and
wastewater systems, bridges, toll roads, museum and art
collections, airports, lottery systems, even streetlights.11 Rising to
6. Paul Burton, How In-Kind Asset Contributions Could Ease
Connecticut’s Pension Funding Woes, BOND BUYER (Sept. 11, 2018, 11:07 AM),
https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/connecticut-mulls-in-kind-assetcontributions-for-pensions [https://perma.cc/9X5T-ZWSN].
7. Max Ehrenfreund, U.S. Austerity Was Even Worse than We Thought,
Data Suggests, WASH. POST: WONK BLOG (July 31, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/31/wonkbook-u-s-austerity-waseven-worse-than-we-thought-data-suggest/?utm_term=.013840713b33
[https://perma.cc/47K9-5NMS].
8. Hilary Russ, Bankruptcy Saves Tiny Rhode Island City, but Leaves
Scars, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2012, 8:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-rhodeisland-centralfalls-bankrupt-idUSBRE88300220120904
[https://perma.cc/5DN6-MM4C].
9. Id.; Jenna Carlesso, Detroit, Central Falls Leaders Share Pitfalls,
Advantages of Bankruptcy, COURANT COMMUNITY (Oct. 17, 2017, 10:00 AM),
https://www.courant.com/community/hartford/hc-news-hartford-bankruptcypanels-20171017-story-html [https://perma.cc/633T-RXD5].
10. Kristen M. Dejong & Beth A. Dougherty, Municipal Bankruptcy: A
Primer on Chapter 9, NUVEEN (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.nuveen.com/
municipal-bankruptcy-a-primer-on-chapter-9 [https://perma.cc/4PH8-CBNQ].
11. The Promise and Pitfalls of Privatizing Public Assets, ECONOMIST (June
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this opportunity, Wall Street has proven adept at connecting cashstrapped municipalities with investors seeking the stable returns
generated by municipal assets.12 Ironically, the one investor
largely absent from the domestic infrastructure market is the one
most in need of a stable return: municipal public pension funds.
The absence of public pension funds as investors in the
domestic infrastructure market is likely due to a combination of the
lack of readily available infrastructure investment opportunities
and an unwillingness to veer from public pension funds’ traditional
investment strategies. A typical public pension fund seeks an
annual investment return of seven to nine percent, by investing in
a combination of fixed income, equities, and alternative assets like
real estate and private equity.13 Despite this targeted return and
asset mix, pension funds often fall short: of the top thirty-four
municipal pension funds in Rhode Island, only one averaged
returns over ten years in excess of its investment target for Fiscal
Year 2016.14 This shortfall forces funds to reach for higher returns
through riskier investments—a strategy with a clear downside.
Infrastructure offers a relatively stable and reliable alternative to
these other asset classes. While this Comment focuses on the
immediate funding, governance, and tax benefits of Asset
Transfers, the match between typical returns on infrastructure
investments and the returns targeted by pension funds is
compelling and should not be overlooked.
This Comment contains four parts. Part I provides an overview
of the pension crisis facing many of Rhode Island’s largest
municipalities. Part II explains Asset Transfers and provides
examples of their historic use by private corporations and their
emerging use by government. Part III focuses on the key financial
benefit of Asset Transfers between public entities: the ability to
22, 2017), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/06/22/the-promiseand-pitfalls-of-privatising-public-assets [https://perma.cc/WM9H-8ZYN].
12. Id.
13. Lisa Abramowicz, 5% is the New 8% for Pension Funds, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 2, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-08-02/5-is-the-new-8-for-reliable-returns-for-pension-funds
[https://perma.cc/3VW6-96EK].
14. See STATE OF R.I. OFFICE OF THE GEN. TREASURER, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR LOCALLY ADMINISTERED PENSION PLANS 44 (May 2018),
https://d10k7k7mywg42z.cloudfront.net/assets/5aec622223f812647e07433b/2
018_Report_of_the_Advisory_Council_for_Locally_Administered_Pension_Pla
ns.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC5K-MKX4].
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continue to invest in capital improvements for the asset on a taxexempt basis. Finally, Part IV addresses important public
oversight and governance matters by considering the composition
of the municipal boards that manage the pension assets of some of
Rhode Island’s largest municipalities, and weighs whether the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is likely to consider them
instrumentalities of government. This final determination both
ensures continued public oversight over critical infrastructure and
preserves the tax exemption described in Part III.
I.

RHODE ISLAND’S MUNICIPAL PENSION CRISIS NEEDS TO BE
ADDRESSED IMMEDIATELY

A. Rhode Island’s Largest Municipal Pension Funds are on the
Brink of Insolvency, and Municipal Leaders Have Limited
Options to Guarantee Future Solvency
Rhode Island’s municipal pension funds have an estimated
collective unfunded liability of $2.5 billion—roughly $2,500 of
liability for every resident of the state. 15 However, this burden is
not evenly distributed. As of 2017, over a third of Rhode Island’s
thirty-four cities and towns have critically underfunded pension
plans. 16 The metrics become even more concerning considering
that the largest liabilities are from communities that form Rhode
Island’s economic core: Providence, Pawtucket, Cranston, Warwick,
Woonsocket, Central Falls, and the urban towns of West Warwick
and Johnston.17
The scale of the unfunded liability varies between these
municipalities, but the dismal prognosis is consistent. Leading the
above group is the City of Providence, whose open employee plan is
only 26.2% funded. 18 The system is estimated to be underfunded
by nearly one billion dollars, and experts have forecasted that,
without major reform, this liability will place a debilitating burden
on the city by 2026.19 Cynics consistently tout bankruptcy as the
15. See STATE OF R.I. OFFICE OF THE GEN. TREASURER, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR LOCALLY ADMINISTERED PENSION PLANS 5 (Apr. 2019),
https://d10k7k7mywg42z.cloudfront.net/assets/5cc74caa438fc35bcc11d181/LA
PP_Report_FINAL_4_29_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9KA-M3ZC] [hereinafter
PENSION PLANS].
16. Id.
17. Id. at 9, 21–22, 24–27, 29, 33–35, 44.
18. Id. at 20.
19. City of Providence Ten Year Plan: Summary of Key Benchmarking

386 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:381
remedy; however, reflecting on Rhode Island’s one example—the
City of Central Falls’ restructuring in 2010—it is clear that such
processes are not a panacea. While the restructuring, combined
with an energetic and forward-thinking mayor, helped Central
Falls regain its financial footing, unfunded pension liabilities
continue to plague the city: only $9.99 million remains in its
employee pension fund, leaving it 26.5% funded. 20 While this dollar
figure is a fraction of the liability faced by Providence and other
Rhode Island municipalities, Central Falls shows that the blunt
cleaver of bankruptcy is not an end-all solution and that
municipalities must consider all available financial tools. 21
B. While Cash Poor, Municipalities are Asset Rich
The budget problems for many of Rhode Island’s municipalities
are rooted in their underfunded pension funds: liabilities greatly
exceed the available assets. 22 This imbalance translates into cash
flow problems when municipalities need to budget funds to make
annual payments toward the unfunded liabilities. Poor investment
returns, skipped payments, and changes in life expectancy
continuously drive these payments upward, exacerbating ongoing
cash flow problems. However, looking beyond the reported
financials of government entities, municipalities are actually quite
asset rich despite being cash poor.23 Consider public buildings,
utilities, highways, golf courses, even street lights—government
owns great assets whose values are not accounted for on the part of
its financials where they are needed most to offset liabilities. This
would be like an individual, when determining their overall net
worth, having to record the entirety of their projected retirement
needs as a liability but not recording against it the value of her
deeded share of the family beach house.
Take, for example, a typical government’s most valuable
assets: water and wastewater utilities. Almost every single one of
Rhode Island’s large municipalities with underfunded pension
Findings, CITY OF PROVIDENCE, 3, 13 (Apr. 11, 2016), https://data.providenceri.
gov/Finance/City-of-Providence-Ten-Year-Plan-Summary-of-Key-Be/xiqd5udr [https://perma.cc/A9RG-K4R4].
20. PENSION PLANS, supra note 15, at 9.
21. Russ, supra note 8.
22. See id.
23. See DAG DEETER & STEFAN FÖLSTER, THE PUBLIC WEALTH OF CITIES:
HOW TO UNLOCK HIDDEN ASSETS TO BOOST GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 5–7 (2017).
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funds also own and operate water or wastewater utilities. These
municipalities carry two burdens: they pay the ongoing costs of
utility employees’ post-employment benefits (pensions and
healthcare) and lose the property taxes from real estate occupied by
these utilities. Surrounding suburbs are often served by these
utilities, and while their users pay regulated rates for consumption,
the above expenses and tax breaks provided by the host
municipality serve as an ongoing subsidy. 24
There is an accounting tool rooted in the basics of corporate
finance that would allow municipalities to account for the value of
these assets without surrendering public oversight and control:
Asset Transfers.
II. ASSET TRANSFERS ARE IMPORTANT AND EFFECTIVE TOOLS

A. The Success of Asset Transfers in the Private and Public
Sectors Proves They are an Effective Tool Rhode Island Should
Consider Using
Asset Transfers move the ownership of a non-cash asset from a
sponsoring entity to its pension fund. 25 Unlike a monetization,
where an asset is sold or leased to an outside entity in return for a
cash payment, no cash is exchanged—ownership of the asset is
simply transferred to the pension fund, and the fund receives a
credit equal to the appraised value of the asset. Unlike other
monetization methods—i.e., a lease or sale—Asset Transfers keep
control of the asset in the same corporate family, allowing the
asset’s value to offset liabilities. The transfer is analogous to one’s
parents moving into a nursing home and signing over the title of
the now empty house to their children—the parent is able to keep
24. The best example of this is the Providence Water Supply Board
(Providence Water), which provides drinking water to sixty percent of Rhode
Island. Its facilities are exempt from Providence municipal taxes; its
employees are city employees who accrue city pension benefits. See Real Estate
Tax Statement 125 Dupont Drive (Providence Water Central Operating
OF
PROVIDENCE
(2018),
https://billpay.
Facility),
CITY
providenceri.com/(S(vf1s2kkudhfaadxl4h50lbf2))/Report/Web_Report_Crystal
Viewer.aspx?REPORTNAME=C:\eGov\Reports\PRV_WEB_TX.rpt&Report
Parameter=YEAR_ID=2018;P_ID=18528;CURRENT_YEAR_ID=2018
[https://perma.cc/9MXP-5DZP].
25. Michael Bennon et al., In-Kind Infrastructure Investments by Public
Pensions: The Queensland Motorways Case Study, STAN. GLOBAL PROJECTS
CTR. 1, 7 (June 5, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2981707 [https://perma.cc/
N895-VF6U].
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the home in the family, while allowing the children to realize the
benefit of ownership.
For decades, corporations have used Asset Transfers to
leverage the value of their assets to improve the funding of their
employees’ pension funds, while maintaining control of the asset
within the same corporate family. 26 For example, Pan American
World Airways staved off bankruptcy by transferring its terminal
leases at John F. Kennedy Airport to its employees’ pension fund;
United States Steel Corporation contributed over a hundred
thousand acres of timberland to its pension fund; and General
Motors moved securities from the balance sheet of a subsidiary to
its employees’ pension fund to improve its fiscal health. 27 Because
the asset is transferred rather than acquired with a cash payment,
the financial benefit is multifold. First, the value of the asset is
immediately recordable against the unfunded pension liability.
Second, any increase in revenues or operating efficiency generates
a cash return for the fund rather than paying the debt service from
the acquisition.
In the case of a government Asset Transfer, there is the
additional benefit of tax-exemption. Because the transfer is a
partnership between public entities, future investment in the asset
and any revenue growth can likely remain tax-exempt so long as
the entity is an instrumentality of government, as described further
in Part III of this Comment.
Consider, for example, the traditional monetization of a
hypothetical water utility with an annual operating budget of $25
million and assets and a customer base valued at $100 million. Preacquisition, consumer rates are set to cover the annual operating
budget and requisite maintenance. If the utility was acquired at
the its assessed value, the purchaser would need to raise consumer
rates or find efficiencies sufficient to cover both the $25 million in
annual operational expenses and the debt payments for the $100
million it borrowed to acquire the asset (or the return on equity
expected by investors who provided the $100 million to acquire the
asset). In addition, there could be tax implications for what were
previously non-taxable income and assets. The result is that
26. Jill Eicher, Public Pensions and the Assets that Could Sustain Them,
GOVERNING (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/
col-public-pensions-transferred-assets-dedicated-funding.html
[https://perma.cc/CYU5-LHHY].
27. Id.
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ratepayers would now be paying twice for the same service despite
giving up control: the acquisition costs of the purchaser in addition
to operational expenses.
Conversely, if the asset were transferred from the
municipality’s ledger to the pension fund using an Asset Transfer,
the municipality could immediately record the asset’s valuation
against its pension liability, and any future appreciation in value
would accrue to the benefit of the pension fund, and ultimately, the
municipality and its taxpayers. 28 Thus, a government Asset
Transfer offers the benefit of maximizing the accounting impact of
the asset’s value, without the involvement of a third party who
would need to derive a return on the system to, at minimum, pay
for the acquisition.
One of the biggest criticisms of monetizing municipal
infrastructure is that it removes public oversight of critical public
infrastructure. 29 A key difference with an Asset Transfer is that
many public pension funds are considered instrumentalities of
government, thereby preserving public oversight. 30 Keeping
essential public assets under public control is good public policy,
and pension funds have proven to be good managers of public
assets. 31 Importantly, while the public maintains governance
oversight through pension boards, moving the asset out from under
the direct umbrella of government affords management greater
autonomy to pursue efficiencies, while also maintaining tax
benefits.32 Such transfers align the interests of labor—maximizing
the efficiency and value of an asset that helps fund their pensions—
and taxpayers who appoint the majority of the pension board
managing the asset.33 The rise of public Asset Transfers in the past
decade highlight these financial, governance, and political benefits,
and are the focus of recent legislative initiatives.34
28. Bennon et al., supra note 25, at 16.
29. Elizabeth Douglass, Towns Sell Their Public Water Systems—and
Come to Regret It, WASH. POST (July 8, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/towns-sell-their-public-watersystems—and-come-to-regret-it/2017/07/07/6ec5b8d6-4bc6-11e7-bc1bfddbd8359dee_story.html?utm_term=.244b1e67fe2a [https://perma.cc/6HVA26J9].
30. See infra section IV.
31. Eicher, supra note 26.
32. See infra section III.A.
33. See Eicher, supra note 26.
34. See infra section II.A.
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In 2011, the state government of Queensland, Australia, made
an Asset Transfer of its toll-road network to its state pension
fund. 35 The initial transfer offset $3.8 billion Australian dollars of
pension liabilities. The pension fund’s management then made
substantial investments to build out the infrastructure, which more
than doubled its value in just three years. 36 Rather than a private
investor booking that return, the Queensland government’s
pensioners received the benefit.37
In the United States there have been several Asset Transfers. 38
In 2017 the New Jersey Legislature signed a “memorandum of
contribution,” contributing the New Jersey Lottery to its pensions
for a thirty-year term. 39 The transfer offset nearly $13.5 billion
dollars in pension liabilities, and the legislative action received
resounding support from both of New Jersey’s legislative
chambers.40
In 2010, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, irrevocably
dedicated parking revenues to the city’s pension funds, contributing
to an upgrade in the city’s credit rating by Fitch, a municipal credit
ratings agency. 41 The City of Hartford, Connecticut, as part of its
efforts to address its fiscal woes, transferred ownership of a 600acre public park to its pension fund, and credited $5 million against
its unfunded pension liability.42
While the public policy
implications behind each of these Asset Transfers differ
substantially—a cash generating lottery is admittedly much
different than a public park—it is clear that models for domestic
Asset Transfers are being formulated as the benefits become better
known.
Several states have initiatives focused on studying Asset
Transfers. On the heels of its lottery transfer, New Jersey’s
35. Eicher, supra note 26.
36. Bennon et al., supra note 25, at 16.
37. Id.
38. See Robert Steyer, New Jersey Approves Budget, Shifting State Lottery
to Pension Fund, PENSION & INV. (July 5, 2017, 3:06 PM),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170705/ONLINE/170709972/new-jerseyapproves-budget-shifting-state-lottery-to-pension-fund
[https://perma.cc/VA64-4JZR].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Eicher, supra note 26.
42. Marc E. Fitch, What Does a Pension Fund Do with a Park?, YANKEE
INSTITUTE FOR PUB. POL’Y (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.yankeeinstitute.org/
2017/04/what-does-a-pension-fund-do-with-a-park/
[https://perma.cc/K8SLV84D].
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Economic & Fiscal Policy Workgroup committed to “[d]evelop
legislation to lay the framework for any future public asset
transfer,” and has undertaken an effort to create an inventory of
public assets suitable for such transfers. 43 In Illinois, the Illinois
Finance Authority, the state’s primary vehicle for infrastructure
investment, is considering the creation of a trust to facilitate Asset
Transfers. 44 The State of Connecticut’s Pension Sustainability
Commission is also discussing the establishment of a similar trust
to manage Asset Transfers of municipal assets. 45
Before investing in a similar such inquiry, determining the
potential governance and tax implications is an essential gating
issue and is the focus of the balance of this Comment.
III. TAX-EXEMPTION MAXIMIZES THE PROFITABILITY OF AN ASSET IN
KIND CONTRIBUTION

A. Asset Transfers Between Government Entities Can Allow the
Asset to Remain Tax-Exempt, Which, In Turn, Maximizes an
Asset’s Profitability and Minimizes the Cost of Future
Operations and Maintenance
It is crucial that the tax-exempt status of municipal assets be
preserved through an Asset Transfer. Tax-exemption ensures that
both the ratepayer and the municipality enjoy a low cost of capital
for operations, maintenance, and improvement. To finance these
capital improvements, municipal entities typically issue bonds,
either backed by the municipalities’ general obligation promise to
repay the lender from tax revenues or by a security interest in the
revenues of income producing assets, like water utilities. 46 The
benefit of tax exemption is that lenders and investors who purchase
43. Leveraging Assets to Stabilize Pension System, PATH TO PROGRESS NJ,
http://pathtoprogressnj.org/proposals/leveraging-assets-to-stabilize-pensionsystem/ [https://perma.cc/9ZB8-L354] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
44. See ILL. FIN. AUTH., REGULAR MEETING OF THE MEMBERS, Feb. 8, 2018,
https://www.il-fa.com/sites/default/files/board-documents/02-08-18-boardminutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P53-JMQK].
45. Burton, supra note 6. The concept of creating a state-managed trust,
which manages assets on behalf of municipal pension funds, offers great
potential from the perspective of a fiduciary duty, and, considering the
potential management of multiple similar entities under one umbrella—
regionalization. Id.
46. NEIL O’HARA, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 1 (6th ed.
2012).
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these municipal bonds do not pay tax on the interest income they
receive and are therefore willing to offer a lower interest rate to the
borrower, resulting in a lower cost of funding for capital projects.47
This lower cost of funding means that a publicly owned enterprise
is able to borrow, build, and expand at a fraction of what it would
cost a private entity.48
Consider the following hypothetical to demonstrate this
benefit. A private water company and a public water utility each
seek financing to build a mile of water mains in new neighborhoods
at a cost of $1 million for each project. Both entities go to the same
lender seeking the $1 million, to be repaid in one year. The lender
needs to receive an average of 5% interest on the loans it makes and
is in a 30% interest tax bracket. This means the private company
will borrow at a 5% interest rate. However, the public entity will
borrow from the same lender at a tax-exempt interest rate of 3.5%
because public borrower’s interest payments will be tax-exempt
income for the lender, saving the lender $15,000 in taxes it would
have otherwise paid. After one year, the private water company
will end up paying $50,000 in interest, whereas the public water
utility will pay only $35,000 in interest, allowing the municipality
to operate and expand at a substantially lower cost. This
differential is further compounded by the fact that these types of
assets are not financed over a year, but rather over a period of up
to thirty or even forty years. 49 This lower cost of financing is a
major reason why the government typically spearheads large public
infrastructure projects.
Traditionally, part of the logic behind exempting government
bonds from taxes is that the benefit of a lower cost to build and
maintain the asset is passed along to the public in the form of lower
fees for service, or a higher operating margin for the entity. Where
allowed, this higher operating margin is often be used to

47. Id. at 30–32.
48. Maria Crawford Scott, Munis vs. Taxables: How to Determine the
Taxable Equivalent Yield, AM. ASS’N OF INDIVIDUAL INV’RS. J. (2009),
https://www.aaii.com/journal/article/munis-vs-taxables-how-to-determine-thetaxable-equivalent-yield [https://perma.cc/ALK7-2E8Q]; O’HARA, supra note
46, at 1–2. The cost of borrowing is lowered even further by the ability to solicit
lenders ranging from individuals investing their retirement income, to
sophisticated institutional investors, through competitive sales of their bonds
into this $2.9 trillion dollar capital marketplace. See generally id.
49. See O’HARA, supra note 46, at 25.
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supplement other municipal revenue sources—i.e., taxes. 50 For an
asset transferred to a pension fund, the ability to borrow and
operate on a tax-exempt basis provides a major benefit of helping
to drive a substantially higher rate of return for the fund while
minimizing the impact on the ratepayer.
In addition to the public benefit, the limitation on the power of
the federal and state governments to tax one another also has a
legal foundation: the constitutional doctrine of “intergovernmental
tax immunity,” rooted in the United State Supreme Court’s decision
in McCullough v. Maryland. 51 Subsequently, there have been
numerous efforts by Congress to curtail the tax-exempt benefit of
municipal borrowings; however, state and local government bonds
largely remain exempt from federal, and often state, taxation.52 As
such, interest payments made to state and local governments’
lenders are tax-free income. 53
However, the government aggressively curtails the use of taxexempt bonds through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). 54 Section 115 of the IRC allows
the IRS to determine if the income of government operations is tax
exempt.55 When a municipality owns and finances a public asset
that provides a public function, the determination of its taxability
is clear; however, debt that is not directly issued by a state or local
government entity, or a designated 501(c)3 organization, with very
few exceptions, is not tax exempt. 56
One of those exemptions is for an “instrumentality” of
government. An instrumentality of government is an entity used
to provide a traditional public function, but which may not
technically fall under the definition of a state or a political
subdivision. 57 Examples provided by the IRS include schools,
50. Julia Kagan, Budget Surplus, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 17, 2018), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/b/budget-surplus.asp
[https://perma.cc/FLT3BESF].
51. See generally 17 U.S. 316 (1819). O’HARA, supra note 46, at 226.
52. O’HARA, supra note 46, at 29, 229.
53. Id. at 30–32.
54. Id. at 230.
55. I.R.C. § 115.
56. See I.R.C. §§ 103, 115.
57. WHAT ARE GOVERNMENT ENTITIES AND THEIR FEDERAL TAX
OBLIGATIONS?, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/federal-statelocal-governments/government-entities-and-their-federal-tax-obligations
[https://perma.cc/L7YX-PDMC] (last updated June 28, 2018) [hereinafter
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES].
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libraries, and hospitals.58 The IRS carefully notes that whether or
not an organization qualifies as an instrumentality of government
depends on certain facts and circumstances. 59 The IRC provides
almost no guidance on this matter.
However, a 1957 IRS Revenue Ruling provides a series of
factors considered by the IRS in making this determination: (1)
whether the organization is used for a governmental purpose and
performs a governmental function; (2) whether the performance of
the organization’s functions is on behalf of one or more states or
political subdivisions; (3) “whether there are private interests
involved, or whether the states or political subdivisions involved
have the powers and interests of an owner”; (4) “whether control or
supervision of the organization is vested in public authority or
authorities”; (5) “whether express or implied statutory or other
authority is necessary” or exists for the creation and/or use of the
organization; and (6) the organization’s degree of financial
autonomy and the source of its operating expenses. 60
Given that an entity must serve a public purpose to qualify for
tax-exempt status, the penumbra resulting from the combination of
these six public purpose seeking factors commands that the
composition of an entity’s leadership be directly traceable back, and
ultimately accountable, to the taxpayer.61 Thus, when determining
if an asset owned by a pension fund would be eligible for taxexemption, the composition of a pension fund’s governing board is
a decisive factor in determining whether it is an instrumentality of
government.62 Frequently, the boards overseeing the management
of pension assets are appointed by both elected officials and entities
that are not democratically elected, but serve public purposes,
specifically labor unions and retired pensioners. 63 For a municipal
pension fund to be considered an instrumentality of government a
majority of a pension fund’s board should be comprised of
individuals appointed by democratically elected officials, rather
than non-governmental parties—i.e., labor unions. 64
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 57–128, 1957–1 C.B. 311).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See PROVIDENCE, R.I., HOME RULE CHARTER pt. 1, art. IX, § 908 (2006),
https://library.municode.com/ri/providence/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId
=PTIHORUCH_ARTIXPEDE_908REBO [https://perma.cc/J9UE-3YCA].
64. See Rev. Rul. 57–128, 1957–1 C.B. 311.
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Rhode Island’s major municipal pension funds are overseen by
boards predominantly representing the public, likely making them
instrumentalities of government well situated to maintain public
oversight and the tax-exempt status of acquired assets.
IV. RHODE ISLAND PENSIONS ARE INSTRUMENTALITIES OF
GOVERNMENT

A. The Legal Structure of the Boards Governing the Management
of Rhode Island’s Municipal Pension Assets Ideally Situate
Them to Execute Asset Transfers on a Tax-Exempt Basis
Rhode Island’s most vulnerable pension funds are well-situated
to execute Asset Transfers on a tax-exempt basis while maintaining
public oversight of the assets. Each municipality has structured
the governance of pensioners’ assets in a different way, however, all
are instrumentalities of government; some are controlled by a
retirement board specifically convened for such purposes, whereas
others are managed by a city investment board that has the
responsibility of overseeing a range of city monies.65
The
composition of these managing boards is the focus of the IRS’s
determination of whether or not a municipality’s pension fund is an
instrumentality of government. 66 Specifically, the IRS is concerned
with whether the board is primarily controlled by the government
directly, through individuals appointed by the democratically
elected representatives of taxpayers—i.e., city/town council
members or elected executives like mayors. 67
The City of Cranston’s pension funds are the clearest example
of what the IRS would consider an instrumentality of government.
In Cranston, the city’s board of investment commissioners oversees
municipal employees’ pension assets.68 This seven-member board
is entirely comprised of individuals that were either democratically

65. Compare WOONSOCKET, R.I., CITY CHARTER ch. V, art. 1, § 3 (2018),
http://clerkshq.com//Content/Woonsocket-ri/books/charter/woonch05.htm
[https://perma.cc/SW65-TTEF], with PAWTUCKET, R.I., CODE ch. 11, art V, § 1126 (21996), https://ecode360.com/8128241 [https://perma.cc/437Z-4BH6].
66. See Rev. Rul. 57–128, 1957–1 C.B. 311.
67. See id.
68. See CRANSTON, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, chs. 2.20.040, 2.28.040
(2018),
https://library.municode.com/ri/cranston/codes/code_of_ordinances?
nodeId=CO_TIT2ADPE_CH2.20POPEFU_2.20.040INTROOACNNRE
[perma.cc/GM67-WFC5].
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elected or appointed by the city’s elected officials.69 Notably, those
responsible for running city government—the mayor, council
members responsible for the budget, city treasurer, and city finance
director—make up the majority of the board, and the remaining
three members are appointed by the city’s democratically-elected
mayor. 70 The ex-officio membership majority, combined with the
three members appointed by the city’s executive, make it an
instrumentality primarily controlled by the executive, with
minimal oversight from the city council and none from labor.71 This
structure is by far the strongest of those surveyed when
determining that the pension fund is an instrumentality of
government.72
The City of Woonsocket’s investment board membership is
similarly well-situated to execute an Asset Transfer without tax
complications or ceding public oversight. The pension assets of the
city’s retirees are managed by a city appointed investment board. 73
The five-member board is appointed by the city’s elected council per
the city’s charter.74 Even though the city’s chief executive (the
mayor) has less control over this membership structure, it is
selected entirely by elected city officials, and the IRS is likely to
view the board as an instrumentality of government as it is clearly
convened to serve the city. 75
While also well situated to be an instrumentality of
government, the Town of Johnston’s Retirement Board gives some
control to non-democratically elected parties: two of its seven
members appointed by public employee labor unions. 76 The Town’s
two labor appointed members are selected by the bargaining units
themselves: the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local
307, and the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO
1950, each select one of their members to serve on the Retirement
69. See CRANSTON, R.I., CHARTER ch. 7, § 7.05(b) (2018), https://library.
municode.com/ri/cranston/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CH_CH7DEFI_S
7.05PODUTR [https://perma.cc/LA77-FWPF].
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311.
73. See WOONSOCKET, R.I., CITY CHARTER ch. V, art. 2, § 3 (2002),
http://clerkshq.com//Content/Woonsocket-ri/books/charter/woonch05.htm#_
CPA8 [https://perma.cc/L8YA-B94E].
74. Id.
75. See Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311.
76. See JOHNSTON, R.I., CODE pt. 1, ch. 47, §§ 47-39(2)–(3) (2018),
https://ecode360.com/16068236 [https://perma.cc/5ESS-L5HY].
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Board. 77 Despite these two appointees, the clear majority of the
Retirement Board membership is appointed by Town officials,
leaving it largely under the Town’s control and therefore likely to
be considered an instrumentality of government by the IRS. 78
The City of Pawtucket’s pension board contains a more
substantial mix of labor appointed members and city appointed
members. 79 Specifically, four of the nine members are appointed
by their respective labor groups: two firefighters are elected and
confirmed to serve by current and retired firefighters, as are two
police officers from and by their respective current and retired
members. Because the balance of the membership (five members)
is appointed by the mayor or council, the body continues to be
primarily government controlled, and should still be considered an
instrumentality of government. 80
The City of Warwick’s city controlled pension funds are
invested by its municipal retirement board.81 Similar to Pawtucket
and Johnston, this eleven member retirement board handles the
investment of pension assets and is comprised of a mix of
government and labor appointees, with four selected by the
pensioners rather than elected officials.82 Of these four appointees,
the president of the municipal employees bargaining unit serves as
one, and the remaining three are elected from and by the city’s
retirees and current employees in accordance with specific
parameters. 83 The overwhelming majority of board members,
however, are appointed by the city’s democratically elected mayor
(as either members of the public or his administration) and the city
council. 84 This structure situates the city’s pension funds as
77. Id.
78. Id. §§ 47-39(1), (4)–(5).
79. See PAWTUCKET, R.I., CODE ch. 11, art. V, § 11–26 (1996),
https://ecode360.com/8128241 [https://perma.cc/R4EK-3F3M].
80. See Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311. The presence of labor
appointees can be problematic in regard to the ruling, which states that a
determining factor regarding whether an entity is an instrumentality of
government can depend on “[w]hether control and supervision of the
organization is vested in public authority or authorities.” Id.
81. WARWICK, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES, pt. 1, ch. 30, § 30-3(b) (1971),
https://library.municode.com/ri/warwick/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PT
IICOOR_CH30INFU_S30-3DEINCOHAPEFU
[https://perma.cc/V3DTEMF2].
82. Id. ch. 6, art. IX, div. 1, § 6-242.
83. Id. § 6-242(6).
84. Id. §§ 6-242(1)–(5).
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government controlled, likely making it an instrumentality of
government.85
In contrast to the other surveyed municipalities, the
composition of the City of Providence’s retirement board is on the
line of maintaining public control, with half of its twelve members
appointed by labor.86 As a home rule municipality, the Retirement
Board’s membership composition is defined under Providence’s
Home Rule Charter, which includes specific parameters and
processes for the selection of both government and labor
members. 87 The mechanics include a combination of appointment
and election, but the end result is the same: half of the members
are appointed or elected by democratically-elected municipal
officials, and the other half are elected by labor groups consisting of
past and present city employees. 88 The city can make a strong
argument that, because the management of the actual investment
duties is handled within City Hall rather than through an outside
entity, the pension fund remains an instrumentality of government.
CONCLUSION

The next recession threatens to push many of Rhode Island’s
cities and towns to the brink of insolvency, and Rhode Island
municipalities should consider Asset Transfers as one of the tools
available to position their pension funds to negotiate meaningful
reforms to reach healthy funding levels. Municipal insolvency
threatens both the basic services relied upon to sustain the state’s
economic core, and the pensions owed to hard working public
employees. 89 Bankruptcy and privatization are not the only
answers. Public assets should remain under public control and can
if transferred to public pension funds. While additional matters
need to be explored—ranging from the mechanics of deriving cash
from a contributed asset to the optimal management structure—it
is clear that under the current tax regime, Rhode Island
municipalities should seriously consider pursuing Asset Transfers
85. See Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311.
86. See PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES pt. 1, art. IX, § 908(a)(1)
(2006), https://library.municode.com/ri/providence/codes/code_of_ordinances?
nodeId=PTIHORUCH_ARTIXPEDE_908REBO
[https://perma.cc/LT4CQMJE].
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Russ, supra note 8.
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as a tool to improve the funding of their respective municipal
pensions. If government must account for its liabilities like the
private sector, it should consider doing the same in how it accounts
for its assets, by using Asset Transfers. It’s time Rhode Island’s
municipalities rebalance their balance sheets.

